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Scholars differ on whether Federal Reserve intervention mitigated banking panics during the Great
Depression and in recent years. The last panic prior to the Depression sheds light on this debate. In
April 1929, a fruit fly infestation in Florida forced the U.S. government to quarantine fruit shipments
from the state and destroy infested groves. When Congress recessed in June without approving compensation
for farmers, depositors in citrus growing regions began withdrawing deposits from banks, culminating
in runs on institutions in the financial center of Tampa and surrounding cities. Using archival evidence,
we describe how the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta halted the spread of the panic by rushing currency
to member banks. Analysis based on a new micro-level database of commercial banks in Florida shows
that bank failures would have been twice as high without the Fed’s intervention. The policy response
of the Fed ended the panic and suggests that similar interventions by the Fed may have been useful
during the Great Depression, even in cases where banks faced questions about their solvency.
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ARRESTING BANKING PANICS: FED LIQUIDITY PROVISION AND 





The financial crisis of 2008-9 saw markets and institutions suffer from illiquidity and 
insolvency. These factors can interact and feed off of each other. For example, if market 
participants lower the valuations of the assets on financial intermediaries’ balance sheets, it may 
call into question the solvency of these firms, prompting collateral calls and a flight by suppliers 
of short-term funds. An inability to obtain accurate information on the fundamental values of 
assets on balance sheets might also lead intermediaries to become unwilling to lend to each other. 
As institutions worry about their own need for capital and their ability to meet investor 
withdrawals, they may retrench, hoard liquid assets, and fail to provide funds to other distressed 
financial institutions; in extreme conditions, the need to raise cash can result in asset sales at 
depressed prices (a “fire sale”) so that liquidity problems can accentuate solvency concerns 
(Brunnermeier and Pederson 2009, Diamond and Rajan 2005). In addition, worsening concerns 
over solvency can increase the likelihood of a liquidity crisis or a run on a financial institution 
(Morris and Shin 2000, Diamond and Rajan 2005). The response of a central bank or lender of 
last resort to banking crises often involves gauging the relative importance of illiquidity and 
insolvency.
 The larger role that illiquidity plays in the crisis, the more vigorously a lender of last 
resort may deem it necessary to extend credit in order to quell a panic.
1 For example, during the 
recent financial crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced a host of lending programs to provide 
substantial liquidity support to financial markets and institutions (Bernanke 2009).  
The recent crisis is hardly the first time that illiquidity and insolvency have severely 
damaged the U.S. financial system. Indeed, the financial history of the United States is replete 
                                                           
1 Summers (2000) emphasizes that preventing banking crises depends on avoiding “situations where the 
bank run psychology takes hold.”    2
with major banking panics that swept the nation as well as more localized episodes. This paper 
investigates a previously neglected panic that occurred just prior to the onset of the Great 
Depression, one which sheds light on how panics develop and spread and how different lender-
of-last-resort actions can contribute to ending them. In April 1929, a Mediterranean fruit fly 
epidemic struck the citrus crop in Florida (a remarkably clear shock that started this episode). In 
order to prevent its spread to other states, the government quarantined Florida citrus shipments 
and destroyed infested groves. Over the course of that spring, it seemed increasingly unlikely that 
farmers would be able to repay their crop loans when they came due during the fall. Congress 
considered compensating Florida farmers for their losses, but recessed at the end of June without 
taking action.  
The size of losses that farmers would suffer, the effectiveness of the eradication 
campaign, and whether the government would compensate growers were all unknown. This 
created uncertainty over the health of bank balance sheets. In July 1929, depositors responded by 
withdrawing funds from banks, culminating in bank runs in citrus growing areas and the failure of 
a key correspondent group headquartered in Tampa, Citizens Bank and Trust Company (hereafter 
Citizens Bank), which served as a financial center for these citrus-growing areas. The solvency 
shock of the fruit fly infestation had developed into a liquidity crisis as well. To halt the panic, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta shipped large sums of currency to the vaults of the two 
remaining large correspondent banks in Tampa on July 17 and 18, and publicly promised to 
provide enough cash to cover all deposits at member banks. By July 20, the run had subsided.  
We have assembled a new micro-level database on commercial banks in Florida that 
allows us to show that deposit outflows prior to the banking panic in July were heaviest in areas 
subjected to the quarantine –  evidence consistent with concerns that the fruit fly and the 
eradication program were directly affecting banks. Data on Florida’s bank correspondent 
networks allows us to then demonstrate how the panic then spread. Deposit withdrawals at banks 
in the citrus growing areas put pressure on major correspondent banks. Correspondent banks were   3
important liquidity providers, and we show how pressure on the major correspondent banks 
impacted other banks. The evolution and nature of the Florida banking panic is consistent with 
models emphasizing how factors affecting the asset side of bank balance sheets, such as 
uncertainty over payoffs or delays in investment projects, can trigger bank runs (Morris and Shin 
2000, Diamond and Rajan 2005) as well as those emphasizing linkages through bank networks 
(Allen and Gale, 2000). 
This response of the Atlanta Fed demonstrates how bold, transparent, and targeted 
liquidity support by central banks can be vital in halting the spread of a panic and altering 
depositor confidence during a crisis even when the root of the crisis is clearly a solvency shock. 
Archival evidence from the minutes of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (the Atlanta Fed) 
shows that officials at the reserve bank were concerned with the panic spreading to institutions 
they viewed as solvent after 8 percent of the state’s banks failed within 48 hours of the closure of 
Citizens National Bank. Officials rapidly provided unconventional liquidity support in Tampa to 
key banks whose closure they believed would result in a further wave of bank failures. We show 
that the response by the Atlanta Fed appears to have successfully stemmed the banking panic, 
changed depositor expectations, and prevented other institutions from failing.  
To get a sense of the importance of the intervention by the Atlanta Fed, we use individual 
bank balance sheet data on the population of Florida banks to construct several counterfactuals. 
We estimate that bank failure rates would have been twice as high in Florida without the Atlanta 
Fed’s decision to provide funds to the key correspondents in Tampa that were facing runs. 
Additional results suggest that the intervention likely prevented banks from exhausting their 
liquid reserves, again helping to arrest the panic. 
Finally, the Atlanta Fed’s response to the panic in Florida illustrates some of the tools 
that were available for responding to liquidity crises on the eve of the Great Depression, and how 
policymakers at one of the regional Federal Reserve Banks viewed their role as a lender of last 
resort. The Atlanta Fed’s response is particularly noteworthy since the Federal Reserve has been   4
criticized for not responding to the banking panics of the 1930s and for having little or no 
experience acting as a lender of last resort during the Great Depression (Friedman and Schwartz 
1963). Given the actions of the Atlanta Fed in 1929, the response by the Federal Reserve to the 
banking panics in the 1930s, or lack thereof, is that much more intriguing.  
The next section of the paper describes the events that triggered runs on the Florida 
banking system in the summer of 1929 and relates it to the theoretical literature on banking crises. 
Section III then describes the policy response of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta after the 
failure of Citizens Bank. Section IV analyzes of the causes of bank distress and the effects of 
lender-of-last-resort intervention. Section V concludes. 
 
II. The Fruit Fly Infestation and Bank Runs 
To understand how a solvency shock associated with the quarantining of fruit-fly-infested 
areas spread into a mid-1929 banking panic in Florida, we first discuss the Mediterranean fruit fly 
infestation that began in April of that year. We then provide an accounting of the bank runs and 
the response of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta to the banking distress.  
 
A. Florida Citrus and the Mediterranean Fruit Fly Infestation: The Real Shock   
  In 1929, Florida’s groves contained nearly 9 million orange and 3.5 million grapefruit 
trees. Revenues from fruit sales totaled $46 million, or 51.7 percent of the state’s revenue from 
crop sales. The largest groves grew in the central peninsula, where the climate protected crops 
from freezing weather and transportation networks linked orchards to worldwide markets 
(Figures 1 and 2).  
  On April 2, 1929, an inspector for State Board of Agriculture discovered grapefruits 
containing larvae of the Mediterranean fruit fly. Scientists at the USDA Headquarters in 
Washington, D.C. confirmed the diagnosis on April 10 (Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1929). 
Florida’s agricultural authorities reacted rapidly. Emergency inspections discovered fruit fly   5
infestations in Lake, Orange, and Seminole counties (Figure 3), with particularly dense 
concentrations around the city of Orlando. The infestation later spread as far north as Ocala 
County and as far south as Osceola County (Figure 4). By July 1929, the Department of 
Agriculture estimated that approximately 34 percent of the state’s land, containing nearly 75 
percent of all the citrus growing trees in Florida, had been infested.  
  The Mediterranean fruit fly posed a serious threat to agriculture throughout the United 
States. Although it preferred to consume fruit, the Mediterranean fruit fly ate a wide array of 
crops, including 72 of the 80 principal fruits and vegetables grown commercially in North 
America in the 1920s. Its lifecycle allowed it to spread rapidly once it gained a foothold. 
Generations matured in two to four weeks and the fly had no natural predators or parasites in the 
U.S. In regions where the fly had become endemic, including Australia, Bermuda, Brazil, South 
Africa, Spain, the West Indies, Hawaii, and nations around the Mediterranean, farmers were 
forced to abandon commercial cultivation of most fruits and vegetables. 
  State and federal governments therefore reacted swiftly to the outbreak. Florida 
immediately quarantined areas around infected orchards and prohibited shipments of fruits and 
vegetables. Florida’s governor mobilized National Guard troops to enforce the quarantine. All 
vehicles passing out of the quarantine area were disinfected by washing the exterior and spraying 
insecticide in the interior of them. The federal government imposed a broader quarantine, 
including inspections of all trains leaving the state. The United States Department of Agriculture 
dispatched 20 scientists and several hundred workers to aid the eradication effort. California, the 
other major citrus growing state, also dispatched a contingent. Eventually, more than 5,000 
people worked in the eradication campaign (Los Angeles Times, July 21, p.1 and July 22, p.1). 
Officials devised a multilayered defense. Zone 1 was the territory one mile around an 
infested orchard, and within this area, authorities destroyed all orchards, crops, and wild plants in 
which the fly might reside. To kill the larvae, laborers burned all fruit found on the ground or 
buried the fruit at least three feet deep and covered it with motor oil and disinfectant. To kill adult   6
flies, workers fumigated infested areas with arsenic sprays or mercury smoke. Authorities 
imposed Zone 1 restrictions on over 400 independent infestations, mainly in the center of the 
state, encompassing over 17,000 acres of citrus groves (Figure 4 shows counties with orchards 
designated Zone 1). Zone 2 stretched for a radius of nine miles outside Zone 1. All fruit on the 
vine was destroyed and previously picked or processed fruit could not leave Zone 2 without 
rigorous inspection and certification as pest free. Zones 1 and 2 covered half of the citrus-growing 
acreage of the state. Zone 3, encompassing most of the rest of the state, required inspections of all 
fruits and vegetables prior to harvesting and/or shipment.  
  Neighboring states also reacted rapidly to the fruit fly infestation. Eight southern and ten 
western states banned the importation of fruit and vegetables from Florida (Los Angeles Times, 
June 23, 1929, p.5) as did many foreign nations – including Canada, Chile, Cuba, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Spain, the Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas. 
  The embargoes, eradication, and quarantine took its toll on Florida’s agricultural 
industry. Fruit production in the affected areas fell by sixty percent. Growers suffered devastating 
losses, including years of investment in trees and infrastructure. Congressional contingents from 
Florida and California therefore proposed Federal relief for farmers forced to destroy crops and 
trees. Under this plan, the federal government would pay part of the losses of the growers. The 
state government would contribute a similar portion, and the farmer would absorb a smaller 
amount. Secretary Hyde of the Department of Agriculture endorsed the plan and recommended 
that Congress appropriate $10 million for the task with the provision that the Federal government 
pay at most half of the amount given to growers (Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1929, p. A20).
2  
Agricultural committee’s in the House and Senate debated the issue in April, May, and 
June. Congressmen from states in the Great Plains opposed compensating Florida’s farmers 
                                                           
2 The proposed $20 million of total aid to growers ($10 million from the federal government and $10 
million from the state government) would have amounted to nearly 40 percent of owners’ equity in 
Florida’s commercial banks (using data from the end of June, 1929). As we describe later, Florida’s citrus 
growers never received this money.   7
unless the government considered similar compensation for losses that grain farmers incurred 
from recent infestations of other pests. In the last week of June, with the issue unresolved, 
Congress adjourned for the summer recess. A newspaper columnist observed that “there is much 
disappointment … at the failure of Congress to grant a relief appropriation before it went into 
recess. Many growers will find it extremely difficult to hold out during the interim until August 
when Congress will reconvene. Nor is it certain that an appropriation will be made then (Los 
Angeles Times, June 28, 1929, p. 1).”  
Reimbursement for losses, however, did not materialize in the month of July, which 
created uncertainty as to whether citrus farmers would be able to repay their loans and stoked 
fears that banks that lent heavily to growers and processors were insolvent and become so. 
Congress continued to debate restitution to growers for more than a decade; the Senate was still 
holding on the issue in 1940. 
  
B. Florida Bank Suspensions in 1929 and the July Banking Panic 
  Florida’s commercial banks had weathered three severe shocks in the 1920s. First, crop 
prices fell dramatically after World War I, and many farmers who had expanded production 
during the war, defaulted on real estate loans. Then, in 1925, Florida’s real estate bubble burst; 
property values plummeted and deposits at banks declined by fifty percent. Finally, Florida was 
hit by two severe hurricanes – one in 1926 and another in 1928 – which resulted in significant 
property damage (more than $1.28 billion in 2008 dollars) and loss of human life. While these 
financial and meteorological storms affected the balance sheets of some banks, some 
commentators suggested that by 1929 Florida’s banking system had fully recovered. “The banks 
of Florida have increased their capital and surplus by 35 percent [as compared to the peak of the 
boom in 1925], have charged off all losses, and regularly have paid dividends … Florida banks 
                                                                                                                                                                             
   8
[are] in a more liquid condition, having more cash as compared with total resources, than … any 
other banks in the nation (Wall Street Journal, January 19, 1929, p. 11).”  
  It was with these initial conditions that the Florida banking system entered 1929 and 
subsequently experienced 64 bank suspensions. The 1929 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve 
Board (p.22) stated that the Atlanta Fed had the largest number of suspensions and fastest growth 
rate in suspensions in the country for that year. It further reported that the increase in failures in 
the Atlanta region was almost entirely driven by a surge in bank failures in Florida and concluded 
that: “In Florida, the suspensions were due largely to the inability of the banks to realize on slow 
assets acquired in prior years, apparently aggravated by heavy withdrawals brought about by the 
disturbance in the fruit industry resulting from the destruction wrought by the Mediterranean fruit 
fly.”
3  
Figures 5 and 6 show the timing and geographical distribution of commercial bank 
failures in Florida. The first batch of bank failures occurred in February. Between the 11th and 
18th of the month, the state comptroller closed six banks after examiners detected problems due 
to financial improprieties. These banks shared common management and all of the institutions 
had loaned large sums to the managers and directors of this “group bank.” These individuals were 
unable to repay and the banks were closed. The second cluster of bank failures occurred one 
month after the fruit fly invaded Florida’s orange groves. Between May 15 and 18, seven banks 
failed in the citrus-growing region. 
  The third and largest cluster of bank failures occurred in July (Figure 5). The Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta became increasingly concerned with the possibility of widespread 
distress in Florida by June. Discussions of these concerns and the actions taken are described in 
the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank (hereafter 
Atlanta Board Minutes). By the middle of June, the Atlanta Fed received a request from Citizens 
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th Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board (1929, p.30)   9
Bank, which was a correspondent to many other banks in the citrus growing center of the state, to 
rediscount eligible and acceptable paper from certain nonmember banks that were a part of its 
banking group for a period of six months “…as a result of the unsettled conditions in Florida, and 
particularly in those sections affected by the Mediterranean fruit fly.” The Board of the Atlanta 
Fed, concerned that a banking panic could spread through correspondent networks, of which 
Citizens’ Bank was a key part of, quickly approved Citizens’ Bank request at their June 14
 
meeting, and sent it on for Federal Reserve Board approval, which granted it on June 17 (Atlanta 
Board Minutes, June 14, 1929, p. 1597 and July 12, 1929, p.1607).
4 
  Nevertheless, withdrawals from banks in the center of the state are described as 
accelerating at the end of June after Congress adjourned without indemnifying losses caused by 
the fruit-fly infestation. Delaying the decision crimped growers’ cash flows, raised the possibility 
that growers might not repay their crop loans, and threatened the viability of financial institutions 
that loaned large sums to citrus growers.
5 Bank directors closed two banks on June 28, the day 
that Congress adjourned.
6 Six other banks closed in the following week. According to materials 
from the Federal Reserve archives, all of these banks had frozen loans.
7 Five had experienced 
heavy withdrawals. Two of the six had faced financial difficulties after their correspondent bank 
closed its doors. In comparison to one year earlier, deposits of Fed member banks in Florida had 
fallen by $38.5 million as of June 30, a decline of 16 percent (Atlanta Board Minutes, August 9, 
1929, p. 1616). Recognizing that the position of commercial banks was worsening in Florida and 
anticipating that it could grow more serious, on July 12, the Board of Directors of the Atlanta 
                                                           
4 Citizens Bank was also the head of a group of banks in which the majority shareholders in Citizens also 
owned controlling shares in these other banks. There also appear to have been other linkages, such as 
correspondent relationships, among these institutions. Unless otherwise noted, the banks that were part of 
the Citizens Bank group (but not Citizens Bank) are dropped from the sample as their failure is not likely to 
be independent of the failure of the lead bank. 
5 Although it is impossible to measure the direct effect of this on the banking system, the value of the citrus 
crop was equivalent to about 22 percent of the value of all commercial bank loans in Florida. 
6 Neither of these banks received injections of capital from investors to keep them solvent (Federal Reserve 
of Atlanta archives, Minutes of the Board of Directors, July 12
th, 1929, p.1606.)   10
passed a resolution authorizing “revolving currency funds” or “currency depots” in Miami and 
Tampa for six months or “for as much time as deemed necessary” to “relieve emergency 
situations as may occur”:  
Whereas the directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta believe that the 
present emergent conditions in the State of Florida make imperative the 
establishment of currency revolving funds of $1,000,000 each to be placed 
respectively in the cities of Miami and Tampa, to the end that member banks in 
the said two cities, or in the vicinity thereof, may readily obtain supplies of 
currency as urgent need therefore may arise. (Atlanta Board Minutes, July 12, 
1929, p. 1607) 
 
Currency funds were established by the Federal Reserve to permit banks quick access to 
currency—typically in areas were large numbers of cash payments needed to be made or in areas 
where financial distress was anticipated—and the Federal Reserve expected it would take too 
long to ship currency from the Reserve Bank. The proposed currency revolving funds entailed 
placing large amounts of currency at “custodian banks,” with the Federal Reserve maintaining 
legal possession of the currency. In return, the custodian banks would provide the Federal 
Reserve with collateral, in this case, U.S. government securities. Currency could be withdrawn 
from the funds by Federal Reserve member banks in cases where cash was being sent to that bank 
through the Federal Reserve—such as via wire transfer administered by the Federal Reserve or as 
part of a discount window loan—but the currency had not yet arrived when it was needed. Once 
the currency arrived it would be used to replenish the fund (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
1938).
8 The Atlanta Fed’s resolution authorizing these funds was immediately sent to the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors for approval. The Board of Governors replied on July 16, stating 
that the revolving currency funds could be established once the Board received the names of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 We refer here to reports compiled by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Division of Bank 
Operations, which provide information on the reasons that banks were closed. We describe these reports in 
detail below. 
8 Federal Reserve approval was needed to before funds could be withdrawn. The custodian banks were 
liable for losses associated with the revolving currency fund.   11
member banks, which would serve as custodians of the funds (Atlanta Board Minutes, August 9, 
1929, p.1626).
9 
Despite the Atlanta Fed’s initial attempts to alleviate distress by allowing nonmember 
banks to rediscount through member banks, the withdrawals proved too great for key 
correspondents in the citrus areas to handle on their own. Steady withdrawals by country banks 
were straining correspondents in Tampa, the financial hub of the citrus industry.
10 The  large 
correspondent banks in Tampa held reserves of smaller country banks operating in the citrus-
growing regions. Country banks had to draw down their reserves as depositors steadily withdrew 
funds. Country banks were likely unable to raise cash by selling assets because most of their 
assets were loans to local farms and businesses and were frozen by the fruit-fly situation. On July 
17, 1929, country-bank withdrawals forced the directors of the Citizens Bank, an institution with 
deposits of $13,695,871, to suspend operations. Citizens Bank had lost a substantial share of its 
deposits in the previous three weeks and had discounted most of its eligible assets ($1,884,051) at 
the Federal Reserve discount window. The suspension of the Citizens Bank triggered runs at 
banks throughout Tampa and nearby municipalities as well as at institutions belonging to the 
Citizens Bank Group. Newspaper accounts stated that “frozen assets from the Florida real estate 
boom and the inability of citrus growers and truck farmers to meet their obligations after the 
invasion of the Mediterranean fruit fly, and the quarantine against the State, are blamed for the 
closing of the banks (Financial Chronicle, Saturday, July 20, 1929, p.422).”
  
While the runs were in progress, lines of panicked depositors grew outside of all banks 
and “business was practically at a standstill in Tampa” (New York Times, July 18, 1929, p.1). 
Within 48 hours, 18 banks closed their doors (8 percent of the state’s banks). Many were either 
                                                           
9 One could think of rediscounting paper for Citizens Bank and its Bank Group as an effort to provide 
support to a particular institution while the revolving currency fund was a general program that could 
provide liquidity support to a number of institutions.  
10  A 1939 WPA study of 67 medium-sized bank suspensions suggests that correspondent banks were 
particularly vulnerable to deposit outflows. During the banking panics of 1930 and 1931, interbank deposits 
declined precipitously. “In most of the banks demand deposits showed somewhat larger percentage   12
members of Citizens Bank Group or respondents of Citizens Bank, but several nonaffiliated 
institutions closed as well. Florida Banking Superintendent Amos stated on July 17 that the 
causes of the failures were “unnecessary withdrawals, propaganda, and the mental attitude of the 
people. There is a financial depression to a certain degree everywhere in the State which has been 
accentuated by the effect of the Mediterranean fruit fly and quarantine. I regard this as the 
darkened hour just before the dawn, however, if the people will not tear down the temple upon 
their own hands. This is what they are doing now” (Financial Chronicle, Saturday, July 20, 1929, 
p.422). During the next week, runs forced seven more banks out of operations. Runs spread 
throughout the state, striking the cities of Gainesville, St. Augustine, St. Petersburg, and Orlando, 
where, in the latter two cities, banks invoked their right to require 60-day notice for withdrawals 
from savings accounts. Further, the Atlanta Fed noted that the runs were affecting banks they 
considered sound; “That the loss of confidence is not confined to depositors of the weak banks in 
Florida is evidenced by the runs upon the St. Augustine National Bank and the First Bank of 
Gainesville” (Atlanta Board Minutes August 9, 1929, p. 1621). What had started as a concern 
over the solvency of banks appears to have added a severe liquidity dimension by mid-July. 
 
C. Closing Banks during the Panic 
  During the summer of 1929, nearly all the bank suspensions resulted in banks being put 
into liquidation by regulators, and hence were classified as bank failures. The primary reason for 
the banks being put into liquidation had to do with the procedure used by Florida bank regulators 
to deal with banks that closed their doors, even temporarily. Florida’s banking law required 
examinations of all banks that ceased making payments to depositors (or other creditors). Banks 
that could demonstrate solvency, sound reasons for suspending payments, and the ability to 
reopen when the crisis passed were permitted to keep their doors closed temporarily. Banks that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reductions than time deposits, and interbank deposits showed much sharper reductions than either demand 
or time.” (Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1939, p.178.)     13
could not prove these points were placed in receivership. Since Florida banks had trouble proving 
the first two points in the spring and summer of 1929, they were liquidated.
11   
The typical Florida bank placed half of its assets in loans and discounts, most of which 
financed the revolving credit needs of local businesses. The fruit fly infestation reduced the value 
of these loans since the likelihood of repayment depended on the success of the eradication 
campaign and on the potential for growers’ to be compensated for their losses, neither of which 
was certain during the spring and summer of 1929. Examiners marked most of these loans at their 
liquidation value, which under the circumstances fell far short of book value.  
The typical Florida bank placed about one-fifth of their assets into bonds. Banks used 
bonds to diversify their portfolio, and usually purchased obligations from governments and 
corporations outside of their vicinity. While the fruit fly infestation had little impact on the value 
of this portion of Florida’s bank’s portfolios, economic events conspired to drive down bond 
prices at this time. As the stock market soared in 1928 and 1929, money flooded into equities and 
out from other investments. Bond prices fell and yields rose with the yield on short-term U.S. 
government rising from 3.09% in January 1928 to 5.09% in May 1929.   
So, banks that suspended operations during the fruit-fly panic faced scrutiny of their 
balance sheets at a time when the bulk of their assets had depreciated in value. Rules required 
examiners to mark these assets at their market or liquidation value. These markdowns turned 
almost all suspensions into bankruptcies when bank regulators turned their charges over to the 




                                                           
11 Upham and Lamke (1934) note that regulators of both state and national banks required banks to mark 
bonds and securities to market.  Rigorous evaluation of closed banks was especially likely to have been the 
case in Florida where Dovell (1955) reports legislation had been passed in 1927 and 1929 at the behest of   14
D. Discussion   
  The evolution of the Florida banking panic appears consistent with some recent 
theoretical models. In Morris and Shin (2000) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2002), depositors 
receive a noisy signal regarding the health of a financial institution. Based on this signal and their 
beliefs about the actions that other depositors might take, depositors decide whether to withdraw. 
The distribution of signals determines whether a bank experiences a run. A unique run/no run 
equilibrium outcome is determined by the distribution of signals. In these models, there are levels 
of signals where the bank clearly survives or fails, but also a region where the equilibrium is self-
fulfilling in the sense that a bank would be forced to liquidate assets inopportunely and become 
insolvent if there is a run or remain solvent if there is no run. 
  During the Florida panic, there appear to have been signals that caused depositors to 
withdraw their funds. In citrus growing areas, the signal was the potential losses due to the 
infestation and the lack of government reimbursement following the eradication. For Tampa, the 
signal appears to have been the closure of Citizens Bank, which was an indication that banks with 
strong ties to the citrus growing region or with large correspondent networks were vulnerable. As 
the panic dissipated in the face of liquidity rather than solvency support, it suggests that there 
may also have been some self-fulfilling aspects to the runs. 
Some theoretical work building on Morris and Shin (2000), such as Atkeson (2002) and 
Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski (2006), argue that, in some situations, it is possible for multiple 
equilibria to emerge if there is something that generates common knowledge, like an interest rate 
that can act as a coordinating mechanism. The panic episode studied in this paper points to some 
reasons why a coordination mechanism might not emerge. Banks in Tampa suffered withdrawals 
from both their respondents and local depositors, groups with very different information sets that 
were geographically segmented. These features would likely have made information gathering 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the State Banking Comptroller to strengthen the ability of the Comptroller to close banks and oversee the 
liquidation process.   15
and sharing quite costly and time consuming, so it is unlikely that the deposit rate acted as a 
coordinating device. Individual depositors were likely focused on getting their cash out of bank 
and were preoccupied with bank survival. Even during this time period, the run seems to have 
occurred with considerable speed.       
The spread of the crisis through the correspondent networks is similar to some of the 
recent theoretical work by Allen and Gale (2000), who emphasize linkages that can transmit 
panics. They show that if bank networks are incomplete, then solvency shocks in one area can 
generate liquidity problems and then solvency problems in other areas. This idea matches the 
observation that runs spread from banks in the citrus growing areas to Tampa where the focus of 
concern appears to include the potential impacts from the failure of other banks.   
 
III. The Atlanta Fed’s Response following the failure of Citizens Bank 
  The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta responded quickly to the failure of Citizens Bank 
and the subsequent bank runs. The New York Times reported that the Atlanta Fed flew $1,000,000 
in cash to Tampa on July 17 and delivered an additional $5,000,000 the next morning. This 
currency was likely connected with the establishment of the revolving currency fund. Federal 
Reserve officers reportedly delivered the funds to the First National Bank and Exchange National 
Bank, the two institutions named as custodians of the currency fund, which remained open but 
faced runs in the wake of the closing of Citizens Bank.
12 These two institutions had significant 
correspondent networks, maintaining correspondent relationships with 31 and 19 other banks, 
respectively. At both of these institutions, long lines of customers were waiting to empty their 
accounts. “Both [banks] withstood the runs, but when they closed their door this afternoon 
throngs were still around the buildings seeking to get to the tellers’ windows to make 
withdrawals” (New York Times, July 18, 1929, p. 1). Creed Taylor, Deputy Governor of the   16
Atlanta Reserve Bank arrived in the afternoon of July 17. The Fed official was quoted by the 
newspapers as stating that the reserve bank was “prepared to send enough money to pay every 
depositor of the First National and the Exchange National if necessary,” that the reserve bank 
“would send addition millions if needed and will be used to establish a currency depot” in Tampa 
(New York Times, July 18, 1929, p. 1). 
According to newspaper accounts, when the second shipment of Fed money arrived, the 
runs on the two Fed member banks in Tampa subsided: “while a number of depositors withdrew 
their money, the bank officials reported, at closing time, that the deposits during the day had 
exceeded withdrawals…Indications were that confidence had been restored and that in the next 
few days most of the money withdrawn yesterday and today will be returned to the vaults of the 
banks. The arrival of $5,000,000 here today and yesterday from the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank 
and the sight of the money in huge stacks in the cages of the bank tellers had a reassuring effect. 
Crowds about the banks were much smaller than yesterday and were there out of curiosity…a run 
continued in Ybor City, but officials were able to meet all demands by depositors” (Financial 
Chronicle, Saturday, July 20, 1929, p.422). 
The intervention in Tampa illustrates the bold response of the Atlanta Fed to a run on the 
banking system. First, the Bank’s policy was highly visible and transparent: high-ranking Reserve 
Bank officials came to the scene of the panic to reassure depositors that their accounts were safe. 
Second, the policy response was overwhelming rather than incremental in the sense that large 
amounts of cash made were immediately made available. The board minutes of the Atlanta Fed 
indicate that between the start of the crisis in July and the second week in August, more than $25 
million of currency was shipped to Florida to deal with the banking crisis (Atlanta Board 
Minutes, August 9, 1929, p. 1624). Third, the response was direct and targeted to the institutions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 The minutes of the Atlanta Fed’s discount window committee indicate that Exchange National borrowed 
a bit over $1,000,000 on July 20, 1929 through the discount window. It is possible that the cash related to 
this loan was drawn from the revolving currency fund.   17
at the center of the crisis. Comments from Governor Black in the August board minutes make the 
Atlanta Fed’s strategy clear:  
Attention should be called to the runs upon the First National Bank of Tampa and 
the Exchange National Bank of Tampa, as reflecting the loss of confidence of the 
citizens of Tampa following the closing of Citizens Bank and Trust Company. 
There were large runs upon both the First National Bank of Tampa and the 
Exchange National Bank of Tampa. Deputy Governor Taylor was present during 
these runs and aided in every way that he could in supplying necessary currency. 
Large sums were sent by airplane by the Jacksonville Branch and large shipments 
were made by mail. On the first day of the run upon these two banks $1,700,000 
was withdrawn from the First National Bank and approximately $1,200,000 from 
the Exchange National Bank. It is gratifying to note that both of these good 
[italics added] banks remained open and that their deposits have been flowing 
back to them. (Atlanta Board Minutes, August 9, 1929, p. 1621..
13  
 
The Atlanta Fed’s actions in Tampa seemed to have been perceived by investors to have 
been credible as the bank runs were arrested. The liquidity support provided by the Atlanta Fed in 
this episode appears to have had some local precedent. Garrett (1956) describes a crisis of 
confidence following the collapse of the Manly-Witham chain during which the Atlanta Fed in 
1926 lent heavily to support Polk County National Bank of Bartow, Florida; this bank was 
reportedly seen as a “key bank” whose failure might trigger other failures (Garrett, 1956, Chapter 
15). The actions taken in Florida in 1929 were also similar to its response to a bank run in Cuba 
in 1926 (where the Atlanta Fed operated an agency). In that instance, the Atlanta Fed, in 
conjunction with the Board of Governors and the Boston Fed, rushed over $30 million in cash to 
Havana, and helped member banks extend credit to correspondents. Newspaper accounts credited 
this intervention with stopping depositor withdrawals.
14  
Compensation for growers never materialized, but optimistic prognostications concerning 
cultivation eventually bore fruit. Before the panic in July, newspaper accounts had predicted the 
widespread destruction of groves, massive losses to citrus growers, a multiyear effort to eliminate 
the pest, and the wholesale destruction of the citrus industry. The eradication campaign 
                                                           
13 Federal Reserve of Atlanta archives, Minutes of the Board of Directors, August 9
th, 1929, p.1621. 
14  Garrett, 1956, Chapter 15; New York Times, “Money Being Rushed to Cuba,” April 11, 1926, p.15 and 
New York Times, “Stocks hit Here as Cuba Recovers,” April 13, 1926, p.8.   18
intensified over the spring and into the summer as additional resources reached the region and 
experience gained over the preceding months on how to destroy the pest increased the efficiency 
of those on the front lines. After July 15, “no trace of the pest [was] found in Orange county, Fla., 
the territory most heavily infested,” and new methods of eradication enabled “the destruction of 
the fly without the loss of valuable groves” (Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1929, p. 11). After 
September 1, 2009, the Federal Government eased the quarantine and allowed fruit to be shipped 
from orchards more than 10 miles from the nearest infestation. 
Even though the call money market remained tight in the last week of July, the New York 
Times reported that the Florida banking crisis had hit rock bottom by the end of the month (New 
York Times, July 25 and 28). Evidence from our bank failure series suggests it took until the end 
of August for the solvency shock associated with the fruit fly to work its way through the banking 
system.  
 
IV. Empirical Analysis of the Florida Panic 
In order to understand the effects of the real shock on the Florida banking system, the 
subsequent liquidity crisis, and the Fed’s response, we assemble a new micro-level database on 
commercial banks and bank failures in Florida for 1929. We construct a data panel consisting of 
all banks that operated in Florida between January and December 1929, which follows individual 
bank performance over the year. Our panel contains standard information about bank 
characteristics (such as balance sheet information) and economic conditions (such as levels of 
farm indebtedness and the condition of the citrus crop) as well as measures of financial distress 
(suspensions and liquidations), all changes in bank status (mergers, consolidations forced by 
financial difficulties, and voluntary liquidations), and paths of contagion (correspondent linkages, 
runs on banks, and geo-coded data showing banks in counties impacted by the quarantine). 
Balance sheet data, correspondent relationships, Federal Reserve membership and other 
individual bank characteristics comes from the Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory and Polk’s   19
Bankers Encyclopedia. Rand McNally is published biennially January and July and Polk’s is 
published biennially in March and September. Data on Florida and the characteristics of its 
counties, which we link to individual bank data, comes from the United States Censuses of 
Agriculture, Manufacturing, and Population. 
  Three independent sources enable us to determine the dates and the nature of Florida’s 
banking crisis. The Board of Governors’, Division of Bank Operations on Form St. 6386b, 
reports individual bank suspensions and their causes. Form St. 6386c reports changes in bank 
status, such as re-openings of suspended institutions and voluntary liquidations, a category of 
closures in which banks ceased operations and arranged to repay depositors the full value of their 
deposits without the intervention of courts or receivers. These data distinguish between temporary 
and permanent closures of banks. A temporary suspension occurred when a bank closed its doors 
to the public for at least one business day even if the bank later reopened for business. Permanent 
liquidations were the subset of suspensions where insolvent banks permanently ceased operations, 
surrendered charters, sold assets, and repaid creditors under the auspices of a court appointed 
officer called a receiver. The second source is the narrative description of events contained within 
the biennial reports of Florida’s state banking department. The third is articles in newspapers and 
periodicals including the Atlanta Journal,  New York Times,  Los Angeles Times,  Wall Street 
Journal, and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. 
  The correspondent networks play an important role as the transmission mechanism and 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics of these relationships. We define a major 
correspondent as any hub institution that had at least seven respondents (banks that received 
clearing, liquidity, and other services from the correspondent). There are nine such institutions in 
Florida at the start of 1929, located in a few major cities. All but a handful of banks had 
relationships with at least one of these institutions and many had multiple relationships. The table 
also shows that about half of the banks that used Citizens bank as a correspondent also had a 
relationship with at least one other institution, suggesting how the failure of Citizens Bank could   20
have been a source for contagion and bank runs. Many of the major correspondent banks had 
respondents located in the areas subject to the quarantine, although Citizens Bank had the largest 
share of respondents in these areas.  
 
A. Deposit Analysis 
To provide some insight into the evolution of the crisis, we make use of the unique data 
we collected on deposits and correspondent relationships. We first document that deposit 
outflows are most significant in areas that were clearly affected by the quarantine. As banks in 
these areas were exposed to the initial solvency shock, it would be natural for risk-averse 
depositors or other banks to remove some of their funds from these banks. This is what we 
observe. Table 2 shows that deposit outflows from March until June were much greater in areas 
where the eradication efforts were centered than in other areas.  
  The historical record suggests that these country banks began drawing down reserves in 
Tampa banks as depositors in citrus-growing areas steadily withdrew funds. As described above, 
Citizens’ Bank, with deposits of more than $13 million, suspended operations on July 17, 1929 as 
a result of deposit withdrawals, which then triggered runs on other banks in Tampa and the 
surrounding areas.  
  Deposit data again shed light on the pressure that the key correspondent banks in Tampa 
were facing. Table 3 shows that the Citizens Bank Group faced a large drain on its deposits 
between March 1929 and either June 1929 or the date member of the bank group closed (the 
interval for which we have data). Correspondents of Citizens Bank that were not a part of the 
group also saw sharp declines in deposits, though not as large as members of the group. These 
declines were much more pronounced than declines at banks not affiliated with Citizens Bank, 
showing that the pressure this institution was facing and suggesting why it sought succor from the 
Atlanta Fed. Even prior to the failure of Citizens, the two other major national banks in the city,   21
Exchange National of Tampa and First National of Tampa, and their correspondents also faced 
significant depositor withdrawals (Table 4).  
Another type of financial institution that existed in Florida in 1929 provides additional 
perspective on the spread of the panic. During the crisis, Florida’s 68 building and loan societies 
(B&Ls) experienced few withdrawals and no failures. Nevertheless, B&Ls faced substantial 
exposure to agricultural shocks because the majority of their investments were tied to local real 
estate, whose value would decline if farmers could not sell crops. However, B&Ls lacked 
exposure to contagion since they did not rely on the commercial banking system’s correspondent 
network in a significant way. B&L deposits at correspondent banks were small and they did not 
rely on them for check clearing. B&Ls also lacked exposure to sudden depositor withdrawals 
because they did not possess demand deposits. They offered only time deposits, in the form of 
mutual shares or certificates of deposit, and these required 30-days’ notice prior to withdrawal. 
Shocks which might have forced building and loans to cease operations would have thus resulted 
in lower share prices for all members (Comptroller of Florida, 1929 to 1931). 
Newspaper accounts and the minutes of the Atlanta Fed indicate that pressure on 
Exchange and First National increased substantially following the failure of Citizens Bank. 
Calculations based on figures from the Atlanta Fed’s minutes suggest that Exchange National and 
First National saw their deposits decline by 11 and 12 percent, respectively, on the first day of the 
panic.
15 If deposit withdrawals had continued at this rate, Exchange National Bank would have 
exhausted its ready reserves (cash plus bankers’ balances) on the second day of the panic, and it 
would have run out of securities that could have been sold and loans that could have been 
discounted on the fifth or sixth day of the panic. First National Bank would have lasted almost as 
long. It would have run out of ready reserves just after lunchtime on the second day, and would 
have exhausted liquid assets three days later. 
                                                           
15 These calculations compare the declines of $1,200,000 and $1,700,000 in deposits for Exchange National 
and First National, respectively, with March (pre-panic) values of deposits.    22
 The Atlanta Fed intervened on July 17 by shipping currency to Tampa and publicly 
announcing support for institutions under pressure. These efforts appear to have successfully 
restored confidence in these banks. As shown in Table 4, deposits from June (prior to the panic) 
through September were little changed at banks having correspondent relationships with the two 
remaining key banks in Tampa.  
 
B. Did the Fed’s Intervention Prevent Solvent Banks from Failing?  
The historical narrative and data on deposits suggests that a banking panic occurred in 
Tampa in mid-July 1929 and was spreading throughout the Florida banking system. A key 
question is whether the Federal Reserve’s intervention in Tampa mattered such that otherwise 
solvent banks were able to survive the panic.
16   We address this question using several 
counterfactual scenarios.  
To construct these counterfactuals, we first determine the probability of failure of 
individual banks over different time horizons.
17 We divide 1929 into four periods: 
•  Period 1: June 26-July 16 – after Congress adjourns with no compensation to citrus 
growers; 
•  Period 2: July 17-July 19 – Citizens Bank in Tampa fails, Tampa panic occurs; 
•  Period 3: July 20-August 5 – following the Fed intervention with support to two Tampa 
national banks; and 
•  Period 4: August 6 until the end of the year – the period after last bank fails due to 
deposit losses and the panic subsides. 
                                                           
16 Records of the Discount Window Committee from the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank list discount loans 
made by the Atlanta Fed in 1929. Regression analysis does not find a systematic relationship between 
discount window loans to banks in Florida in the weeks leading up to Citizens Bank’s failure and a change 
in the failure/survival outcome during the panic period. 
17 We drop banks that were members of Citizens Bank Group from the analysis from here forward as their 
fate was dependent on that of the main bank.   23
We estimate a logit regression using individual bank data that includes information regarding the 
correspondent relationships (which we argue served to transmit the shock), exposure to the fruit 
fly eradication program, and the expected probability of survival from a first-stage regression 
using pre-crisis period characteristics. The second-stage logit regression takes the form: 
(1) Fail/No Fail = f (period, major correspondent in Jacksonville, period*major Florida non-
Jacksonville correspondent, period*major Florida non-Jacksonville correspondent fails, 
other bank in county experiences a run in current or preceding period, quarantine zone 
county, period*expected survival probability from first stage. 
We divide the major correspondents into those in Jacksonville and outside Jacksonville because 
there was a branch of the Atlanta Fed located in Jacksonville, so concerns about liquidity issues 
and the response to Federal Reserve liquidity provision programs may have operated differently 
there. Since we are interested in estimating the effects of the major correspondents on 
respondents, we exclude these 9 banks from the estimation.  Of the major Florida correspondents, 
Citizens Bank is the only one that failed in 1929. 
To construct the first-stage regression, we use balance sheet information from all Florida 
commercial banks in existence in January 1929 to examine whether these bank characteristics 
were good predictors of failure in the pre-crisis period. Our predictors for suspension are (log) 
total assets, interest-earning assets as a share of total assets, bonds and securities’ share of 
interest-earning assets, net worth to total assets, liquid deposits, the (log) age of the bank, and the 
population of the town where the bank is located. Table 5 shows logit (maximum likelihood) 
estimates of the probability of suspending prior to June 26 (just before Congress adjourns without 
appropriating funds to reimburse orange growers and before the banking panic begins) based on 
1929:Q1 characteristics.  
  Generally consistent with previous studies, the results from the first-stage regression 
show that that, all else equal, banks were less likely to suspend when they held more bonds 
relative to loans (bonds tended to be less risky and more liquid), were older, and were located in a   24
larger town. Banks with more cash on hand relative to deposits were also less likely to close. 
These regressions reveal that measures of bank health (reflecting solvency, liquidity, portfolio 
risk, and owner’s exposure among other factors) were correlated with failure in much the same 
way as other studies of bank failures during this period (Calomiris and Mason 1997, 2003; White 
1984; Carlson 2010). 
These failure regressions establish a baseline that we use in the second stage to provide 
an indicator of the health of each bank coming into the banking panic. That is, since these 
regressions use balance sheet data and failure information from the period prior to the panic, we 
use the predicted probabilities of survival from them as ex ante measures of the condition of each 
bank on the eve of the panic. 
Regression results estimating equation (1) are shown in Table 6. As one would expect, 
given the source of the shock, being in a county in which the infestation occurred increased the 
likelihood of failure. The expected survival probability from the first-stage regression also tends 
to decrease the likelihood of failure, suggesting that banks that were healthier before July were 
less likely to fail. We find that being in the vicinity of bank runs is associated with an increased 
likelihood of failure. Overall, the regression reasonably predicts failure over the year. The 
average predicted probability of failure conditional on the banks failing is 15 percent whereas the 
average predicted probability of failure conditional on having survived the panic is 3 percent. 
We find that having a major correspondent bank fail notably increased the odds that its 
respondents would fail. There are a few potential reasons for this finding. First, the major 
correspondents served as a source of liquidity for their respondents and having this source dry up, 
especially during a panic, may have prompted some banks to close their doors. Correspondents 
also provided important clearing services for their respondents and the loss of the correspondent 
may have negatively affected the business prospects of these institutions. Also, during a panic,   25
being a respondent of a failing correspondent bank may have caused concern among other banks 
or depositors about the health of the respondent and prompted withdrawals.
18  
To consider what would have happened if the banking panic had gone unchecked, we 
calculate failures for several different scenarios. The first row of Table 7 shows actual failures 
during the period July 20 to August 5, 1929. The second row shows failures in this period 
predicted by our regression. The third row considers a scenario where the two key correspondent 
banks in Tampa (Exchange National and First National) failed. We do this by changing the 
indicator variable for having a large non-Jacksonville correspondent bank fail from zero to one 
for banks that used Exchange National or First National as a correspondent and recalculating the 
expected probability of failure of each bank. (Thus, we assume that the impact of the failure of 
Exchange National or First National has the same impact on likelihood of failure of their 
respondents as the failure of Citizens Bank had on its respondents.) We estimate that 14 banks 
would have failed if the Fed had not intervened – nearly doubling the failures that actually 
occurred during the crisis period.
19 Having all non-Jacksonville correspondents fail, the fourth 
row of Table 7, would have increased failures slightly more. The last row of Table 7 shows the 
results from a counterfactual scenario where all major correspondent banks—those in 
Jacksonville and outside Jacksonville—failed, assuming that the impact of a failure of a 
Jacksonville correspondent would have had the same impact as the failure of other banks. We 
construct this “upper bound” estimate of the impact of the crisis in a manner similar to the 
previous counterfactual only with the indicator of a large correspondent failing equal to one for a 
                                                           
18 Others, such as Carlson (2004), have found that the loss of a correspondent bank increases the likelihood 
that a smaller “downstream” bank will close. 
19 Although we are able to provide some plausible estimates as to how much worse the situation would 
have been without the policy intervention, we are not able to identify the exact channel by which the 
Federal Reserve liquidity support mattered. One possibility is that the intervention prevented fire sales 
and/or mitigated depositor concerns that the banks would be unable to meet deposit withdrawals when 
needed. A second possibility is that the intervention may have bought depositors time, allowing them to 
evaluate the quality of banks during periods when asset values were less uncertain and reduce the 
information problems that can generate runs (Morris and Shin 2000). One might also imagine other 
channels.   26
larger set of institutions. Under this extreme scenario, we calculate that 30 percent of all banks in 
Florida would have failed.  
The counterfactuals provides some estimates of further banking distress in Florida absent 
Fed intervention; however, it is likely that they fail to capture some of the effects that the 
intervention had on restoring confidence in Florida’s banking system. We know from historical 
accounts that runs occurred in other cities like St. Augustine and Gainesville, and these ended 
when the Atlanta Fed intervened (Atlanta Board Minutes, August 9, 1929, p.1621). To what 
extent, then, did the Fed’s action halt deposit withdrawals that would have otherwise led to a fire 
sale of assets, additional suspensions, and a broader banking crisis? Such a calculation would be 
straightforward if it were possible to count how many banks ceased having runs after the Fed 
intervened. Since we cannot determine this figure, we instead compute estimates of banks that 
would have exhausted cash and liquid reserves for deposit withdrawals of various magnitudes. 
Once liquid reserves are exhausted by depositor withdrawals, banks might have been forced to 
call in loans or attempt to dispose of less liquid assets at fire sale prices. However, many of the 
banks facing runs in July 1929 may have had significant exposure via loans to citrus growers, and 
since the valuations on these loans was uncertain, it is likely that many if not all of the banks 
facing deposit withdrawals greater than their liquid reserves would have been forced to suspend.  
Table 8 indicates the suspensions or fire sales that would have resulted from deposit 
losses of various sizes. The calculations are based on June 30 call-report data for state banks and 
July 1 data for national banks. Banks typically held less than 35 percent of their assets as liquid 
reserves, so we use this as the highest value in the table: values above this would have resulted in 
the closure of all banks. Although we present a range of deposit withdrawals in the table, it may 
be fruitful to think about what value is most plausible. As we have noted above, the key event of 
the panic was the failure of failure of Citizens Bank Group, which saw deposits fall by 30 percent   27
before suspending.
20 So, assuming deposit declines of 30 percent in our “stress test,” we find that 
more than 50 percent of all banks would have been in a “fire sale” situation or suspended if they 
only had access to cash. Roughly 6 percent of banks would have suspended or invoked a “fire 
sale” if they could use all their liquid reserved to fight deposit withdrawals. This means that, even 
in cases where banks could have drained all their liquid reserves to fight off a run, the number of 
failures in the panic period would have roughly doubled. 
As might be expected, experiences on how quickly banks shut down appear to have 
depended on how severe deposit losses were prior to the panic in July. Institutions that 
experienced deposit losses during the spring quarter (after the discovery of the fruit fly and before 
Congress adjourned at the end of June) closed their doors rapidly once runs began. Others were 
reported to have closed their doors to forestall runs that they feared would materialize. 
Institutions whose deposits remained stable in the spring sustained larger losses of deposits before 
closing their doors. If we use the rate of withdrawals from banks in Tampa on July 16
th and 17
th 
(as reported in the minutes of the Board of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta) as a benchmark, 
then we can approximate how many days banks stayed open before closing. Using this metric, 
more than half of all banks closed on the first day that they were run. Most remaining banks 
suspended on the second day that they were run. A few opened on the third morning, but none 
survived three full days. 
Of course, once runs spread more widely and a fire sale begins, spillovers to otherwise 
solvent institutions are likely to occur and a vicious cycle can develop which would push failures 
notably higher (Summers, 2008). These findings are consistent with the evidence from the 
Atlanta Fed’s archives in that it suggests that the Fed’s intervention played an important role in 
stopping the panic and from preventing an even more severe crisis from occurring.  
                                                           
20 Two other examples support the 30 percent drop as a reasonable benchmark. Mississippi experienced a 
banking panic in November –December 1930 where the Fed did not intervene; in this episode the gross 
outflow of deposits was also approximately 30 percent. The WPA study of 67 medium-sized banks that   28
 
V. Conclusion  
Just as the Federal Reserve took emergency measures to respond to the financial crisis of 
2008 and 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta was willing to undertake extraordinary 
measures in the summer of 1929 to prevent a meltdown of Florida’s financial system. After the 
failure of Citizens Bank group, the Atlanta Fed responded to the panic taking place in key 
correspondent banks in Tampa by shuttling cash from its headquarters to the scene of banking 
distress, and by publicly pronouncing that it would take all means necessary to ensure the safety 
of depositors. Without this intervention, we estimate that bank failures would otherwise have 
been twice as high as what they turned out to be. 
The response by the Atlanta Fed stands out for two reasons. First, it suggests that prior to 
1930 the Federal Reserve had the knowledge and experience to calm anxious depositors and 
bankers during a panic. Federal Reserve officials demonstrated that they could effectively 
leverage their discount window lending capability with public announcements. This raises 
intriguing questions about the Federal Reserve’s response to Depression-era bank panics where 
the Federal Reserve has been criticized as not responding forcefully enough. Scholars have put 
forth a number of potential reason why this might have been the case, though the matter is far 
from resolved. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argued that the Fed was either unwilling or unable 
to provide support. Wood (2005) argues that the Federal Reserve was more focused on the New 
York financial markets, especially the money markets, for signs of panics. Eichengreen (1992) 
and Temin (1989) emphasized that the Fed was constrained in its ability to respond as long as it 
stayed on the gold standard. Given that considerably more control over policy was given to the 
regional Federal Reserve Banks at that time, and, as pointed out by Wood (2006) and Meltzer 
(2003), there was considerable disagreement among the Reserve Banks and between the Reserve 
                                                                                                                                                                             
suspended during the Great Depression finds that average deposits declined by 37 percent prior over a 
period of two years prior to suspension (Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1939, p. 178).   29
Banks and the Board of Governors about the cause and appropriate response to the economic 
stresses during the 1930s, formulating a strong response to the more widespread Depression-era 
banking panics might have been difficult. This challenge may have provided a further impetus for 
the strengthening of the Board of Governors during the financial reform acts of the 1930s.  
Recent scholarship has provided evidence that more activist lender of last resort policies 
during panics might have helped moderate the number of banking failures during the 1930s. 
Carlson (2010) argues that panics can be disruptive because the increased difficulty obtaining 
accurate information during such periods combined with an elevated number of banks needing 
assistance during these periods can reduce the number of banks able to recapitalize or merge with 
other institutions and thus raise the number of failures. Further, Richardson and Troost (2009) 
find that active lending by the Federal Reserve during the panics of the Depression helped reduce 
bank failures.   
This brings us to the second reason why the episode is important. The Florida banking 
panic illustrates how an insolvency shock (in this case the potential losses stemming from the 
destruction of the citrus crop) can induce runs on banks and a precipitate a liquidity crisis. We 
also describe how correspondent banking networks can transmit shocks from the smaller 
institutions to the main liquidity providing banks. We demonstrate that problems at these 
correspondents can then spread back out to other banks and provide a channel for contagion.  
The Florida banking panic nevertheless shows how central bank policy interventions can 
be successfully used to respond to shocks of this nature as the intervention by the Atlanta Fed 
appears to have contributed importantly to ending the liquidity crisis and our estimates suggest it 
kept some otherwise solvent banks from being closed.  
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Figure  1       Figure  2 
Orange Trees in Florida, 1929      Fruit Revenues in Florida, 1929 
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Original Infestation: Counties  Where      Quarantine:  Counties  Containing 





















Notes: Black indicates more 
than 1,000,000 trees in the 
county. Gray indicates more 
than 200,000 trees. 
 
Source: US Census.  
 
 
Notes: Black indicates fruit 
crop revenue of more than 
$10 million in 1929. Dark 
gray indicates revenue 
between $5 and $2 million. 
Light gray indicates revenue 
between $2 and $1 million. 
 
Source: US Census. 
 
Notes: Black indicates 
counties in which 
Mediterranean Fruit Fly 
detected on or before April 
15, 1929. 
 
Source: US Senate, 1941.  
 
 
Notes: Black indicates 
counties containing Zone 1 
and Zone 2 quarantines. Gray 
indicates counties containing 
Zone 2 quarantines.  
 
Source: US Senate, 1941. 
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Source: See text. 
Notes: Solid symbols indicate number of banks suspending each week. Dotted line indicates a 
weighted moving average of the weekly number of failures. The kernel averaging formula of Nt = 
nt-2/16 + nt-1/8 + (5/8)*nt + nt+1/8 + nt+2/16 provides a smoothed series without obscuring surges in 
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Figure 6   35
 


































Tampa 20  20  10  14 
Atlantic 
National Bank  Jacksonville 114  5  42  53 
Florida 
National Bank  Jacksonville 59  4  24  31 
Barnett 
National Bank  Jacksonville 36  0  19  17 
Exchange 












Miami 7  0  5  0 
Bank of Bay 
Biscayne  Miami 7  0  5  0 
 
Notes: A correspondent is a hub bank that provides clearing, liquidity, and other services 
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Table 2. Deposit Outflows by Quarantine Status  
 
   Median  Mean  Std.  Dev  N 
          
Banks Outside Fruit-Fly Quarantine Zone           
  March to June 30 or Failure    -3.6  1.2  39.6  77 
  June 30 to September or Failure    -0.0  1.3  25.2  76 
  March to September or Failure    -3.9  -0.9  26.0  75 
          
Banks in Partially Zoned Counties           
  March to June 30 or Failure    -7.9  -12.2  23.7  41 
  June 30 to September or Failure    -0.0  -2.3  16.7  32 
  March to September or Failure    -5.7  -9.0  21.5  32 
          
Banks in Completely Zoned Counties           
  March to June 30 or Failure   -7.2  -2.6  28.9  62 
  June 30 to September or Failure    -0.0  1.8  32.1  60 
  March to September or Failure    -5.4  -1.7  35.2  60 
          
Note: Polk’s Banker’s Encyclopedia did not update balance sheet data for sixty-four banks between the 
March and September editions. These institutions tended to be small, state chartered, country banks in the 





Table 3. Deposit Drains on Citizens’ Bank Group and its Correspondents 
 
   Median  Mean  Std.  Dev  N 
          
Banks Without Tampa Correspondents           
  March to June 30 or Failure   -4.7  -0.2  35.6  129 
  June 30 to September or Failure    -0.1  1.6  28.4  126 
  March to September or Failure    -4.7  -0.4  30.7  125 
          
Citizens Group           
  March to June 30 or Failure    -12.4  -16.5  12.0  11 
  June 30 to September or Failure    -15.2  -15.5  5.3  11 
  March to September or Failure    -27.2  -29.0  13.2  11 
          
Citizens Network (excludes group)           
  March to June 30 or Failure    -19.9  -19.1  25.0  20 
  June 30 to September or Failure    -10.1  -4.5  28.6  16 
  March to September or Failure    -21.3  -18.4  23.8  16 
          
Note: Polk’s Banker’s Encyclopedia did not update balance sheet data for sixty-four banks between the 
March and September editions. These institutions tended to be small, state chartered, country banks in the 
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Table 4. Deposit Pressure on the other National Banks in Tampa 
 
   Median Mean Std.  Dev N 
          
Banks Without Tampa Correspondents           
  March to June 30 or Failure    -4.7  -0.2  35.6  129 
  June 30 to September or Failure    -0.1  1.6  28.4  126 
  March to September or Failure   -4.7  -0.4  30.7  125 
          
Correspondents of First National Bank           
  March to June 30 or Failure    -10.6  -5.0  26.0  13 
  June 30 to September or Failure    0.0  -3.0  9.6  10 
  March to September or Failure    -3.5  -1.8  18.2  10 
          
Correspondents of Exchange National Bank           
  March to June 30 or Failure   -7.3  -6.3  21.5  18 
  June 30 to September or Failure    0.0  0.8  13.7  18 
  March to September or Failure    -1.9  -6.8  19.0  18 
          
 
Note: Polk’s Banker’s Encyclopedia did not update balance sheet data for sixty-four banks between the 
March and September editions. These institutions tended to be small, state chartered, country banks in the 
extremities of the state. All survived the fruit-fly crisis of 1929.  These banks have been excluded from the 
calculations.   38
Table 5. Predicting Bank Health Using First Quarter of 1929 Characteristics  
 
Dependent Variable: suspension prior to June 26 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Independent Variable                 Coefficient     Std. Err.   P-value 
 
Log  assets        .41   .40   .31 
Interest earning to total assets          -.02       .04        .60 
Bonds to interest earning assets       -.09       .02        .00 
Net worth to assets        -.03       .04    .38 
Cash to deposits          -.07       .03        .02 
State  Bank      -.56         .61           .36 
Log town population        -.33       .22        .14 
Log  age  of  bank      -.09         .04           .01 
Constant                        2.48               5.36    .64 
 
O b s e r v a t i o n s       2 6 4  
Suspensions        24 
Log  likelihood      -60.7 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Equation estimated using a logit regression. Negative coefficients indicate that the variable increases 
the odds of survival. 
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Table 6. Predicting Bank Failures during the Panic Period 
 
Dependent Variable: suspension in a particular period 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Independent Variable            Coefficient        Std. Err.        
 
Period  1       -4.24***              .92    
Period  2       -5.85***                1.14    
Period  3         -4.39***  2.34    
Period 4            -4.56***        4.45     
Has a large Jacksonville corresp.        -.83      .63 
Has large non-Jacksonville corresp.*period 1  -1.83*    1.00   
Has large non-Jacksonville corresp.*period 2     .59    1.60     
Has large non-Jacksonville corresp.*period 3  -1.64    1.22     
Has large non-Jacksonville corresp.*period 4      ----     
Large non-Jacksonville corresp. fails       2.67**   1.32     
Run in county*period 1           2.15***    .74     
Run in county*period 2             .98    1.30     
Run in county*period 3           1.56*      .93 
Run in county*period 4             .59    1.20 
County quarantined          1.64**      .70     
Survival  probability*period  1    -2.26   2.39    
Survival  probability*period  2    -2.20   3.39    
Survival  probability*period  3    -2.89   2.38    
Survival  probability*period  4    -6.09*   3.37    
 
O b s e r v a t i o n s       7 6 6  
Banks       221 
Suspensions        39 
Log  pseudo  likelihood     -91.3 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Equation estimated using a logit regression. Negative coefficients indicate that the variable increases 
the odds of survival.  Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level. ** indicates p<0.01 and * 
indicates p<0.05.   40
Table 7. Estimating Expected Bank Failures for the Panic Period, 






institutions at risk 
Actual or expected 
bank failures 
Actual failures      8 
Baseline regression  .039  205  8 
Failure of Exchange National & 
First National of Tampa  .066 205  14 
All non-Jacksonville correspondents 
fail  .076 205  16 
All correspondents fail (including 
Jacksonville correspondents)  .300 205  61 






Table 8. “Fire Sale” Stress Tests 
 
Hypothetical 
decline in deposits 
due to bank runs 
Number of Suspensions/Fire Sales:  
All Florida Banks 
Number of Suspensions/Fire Sales:  
Banks in Quarantine Zones 1 & 2 
  Exhaust Cash  Exhaust Cash and 
Securities 
Exhaust Cash  Exhaust Cash and 
Securities 
5% 0  0  0  0 
10% 3  0  2  0 
15% 22  0  11  0 
20% 51  1  25  1 
25% 98  3  52  1 
30%   139  16  69  7 
35% 162  25  82  9 
Note: The table shows how many banks that would have exhausted various liquid assets given the decline 
in deposits shown in column 1. 13.2 percent is the deposit loss before suspension (from June 30 until mid-
July) experienced by banks that failed during the July panic. 22 percent is the deposit loss before 
suspension (from January until suspension) for all banks that failed during the year of 1929. 